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Introduction 
An important goal of the European Member States 
is the limitation of the global temperature change to 
no more than two degrees above pre-industrial 
levels. To achieve this goal, different approaches 
are being implemented. One of them is the 
European emission trading system (EU-ETS), which 
is a “cap and trade” system for GHG emission 
allowances. Another approach is to increase the 
share of renewable energy sources (RES) in (gross) 
final energy consumption. This is achieved by 
different political instruments such as fixed quotas 
or feed-in tariffs for electricity production from RES. 
Figure 1 shows the classification of promotion 
strategies for renewable energy. These strategies 
have led to an increasing share of renewable 
energy, especially wind and solar power. Due to the 
increasing feed-in of electricity from intermittent 
renewables, the number of operating hours of 
conventional power plants is decreasing. Therefore 
the revenue situation, especially for base load 
power plants, is worsening. As large amounts of 
electricity from RES, such as wind and solar power, 
feed into the energy-only-markets (EOM), the price 
tends to decrease, since these technologies have 
marginal costs of zero (merit-order effect). Only 
during periods when RES are not operating at full 
capacity and the demand is covered at least partly 
by conventional generating capacity, the price will 
be set by the marginal costs of the fossil-fuel 
generators. In summary, higher prices are set by 
fossil-fuel generators if intermittent RES are not 
covering the full load. Therefore these RES are not 
or only partly gaining profits from high prices.
  
Executive summary 
The increasing share of electricity production from renewables is achieved by political promotion strategies 
like feed-in tariffs, which foresee payments for renewables outside of the electricity market. Assuming a 
phase out of the existing promotion strategies, the question arises if other or additional market design 
options for promoting low carbon technologies are necessary. In this paper, we have made an assessment 
based on the literature to identify possible market designs that are focusing on the promotion of low carbon 
technologies. The discussed options for altering the current market design range from providing greater 
certainty for future carbon prices, over capacity mechanisms for conventional as well as for renewable 
energy to a complete restructuring of the market design. The study shows that there seems to be three 
main tendencies to promote low carbon technologies, namely existing EOM with market add-ons for low 
carbon technologies, a separate market for low carbon technologies or an overall single market based on 
levelized costs. 
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Figure 1: Classification of promotion strategies for RES (Source: A. Ceña, KIC InnoEnergy) 
Additionally, the overall target of reducing GHG 
emissions is not directly considered in the EOM. The 
price for the GHG emission allowances is reflected 
within the marginal costs of conventional electricity 
generation. However, it is unclear to what extent 
intermittent RES would benefit from higher 
electricity prices caused by EU-ETS for the same 
reasons as mentioned above. 
Strategies to promote renewable energy increased 
the share of RES, while at the same time this 
market externality influenced the EOM in a way that 
prices strongly decrease with high levels of 
electricity feed-in from RES (the so-called merit 
order effect). The price decrease leads to lower 
revenues for conventional generators. Assuming 
that the promotion of renewable energy is phased 
out, the question is whether investments in RES 
would reduce or not. 
Therefore, the key question is whether there is a 
"missing-money-problem"1 for new investments in 
low carbon technologies2, and how this can be 
mitigated by altering the market design. 
                                               
1 The term “missing-money-problem” is normally 
associated with conventional capacities and actually 
stands for “missing investment incentives”. 
2 Within this publication low carbon technologies cover 
RES, nuclear power plants, and conventional power plants 
with carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
Is there a “missing-money-
problem” for low carbon 
technologies? 
The increasing RES capacity in the system has been 
driven by political promotion strategies to date, 
guaranteeing sufficient revenue streams for these 
technologies. The presence of these strategies 
indicates that RES technologies are not able to 
refinance themselves on the energy-only-market 
due to their high investment costs. What is evident 
is that schemes have led to decreasing material 
cost and an improvement of the efficiency of RES 
technologies, which in turn have reduced the 
associated investment costs and therefore the 
levelised costs of electricity (LCOE).  
Figure 2 shows a comparison of the levelised costs 
for different production technologies. While RES 
technologies are still higher than conventional 
generators, in some cases, notably solar 
photovoltaic (PV) and onshore wind, the costs are 
in the same range. This leads to the question of 
whether RES are competitive in an energy-only-
market, if the promotion strategies are phased out, 
or if there is also a “missing-money-problem”.  
As previously mentioned, RES with low or zero 
variable costs tend to decrease the electricity price 
in an energy-only-market based on marginal costs. 
The price reduction effect is increasing with an 
increasing RES capacity [Kopp 2012]. Due to this 
price reduction effect, RES are probably not able to 
recover their capital investment under the current 
market design, leading to the “missing-money–
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problem”. An analysis by Kopp (2012)] shows that 
intermittent RES cannot refinance on the energy-
only-market in the long run, even if their LCOE fall 
below the LCOE of conventional power plants. This 
is also the case in scenarios where a high CO2 price 
and increasing fuel prices are assumed3.  
The price reduction effect of RES, often called the 
merit-order effect, is also reducing the revenue 
streams for conventional power plants as well as for 
other low carbon generators, like nuclear. With an 
increasing share of renewable energy sources it is 
likely that there will be a “missing-money-problem” 
for all low carbon technologies. 
In the following section, we provide an overview of 
possible market designs that address this issue. We 
focus on the studies by Baker (2010) and HM 
(2010) to analyze possible market designs for low 
carbon generators in general, and Winkler (2012), 
Öko-Institut (2014) and Kopp (2013) regarding 
market designs for renewable energy sources. 
 
Figure 2: LCOE of renewable energy 
technologies and conventional power plants at 
locations in Germany in 2013 (Source [Kost 
2013]) 
Possible market designs 
Table 1 gives an overview of the market design 
options that are considered in this paper. Some of 
the presented options are quite similar but are 
presented in the literature in a different context. 
                                               
3
 However, different literature sources state that this is 
strongly dependent on the development of the market 
framework. In a model based analysis, Höfling (2013) 
shows that a capacity scarcity or an increasing demand 
can lead to investments incentives in new capacities in an 
EOM. For further studies on the market value of RES, refer 
to Hirth (2013) and Nicolosi (2012). 
Therefore the options can be distinguished by their 
aim. Options 1-7 focus on a market design for low 
carbon technologies (section A), while options 8-11 
evaluate market design options for a completely 
renewable energy system (section B). Finally, 
options 12-13 focus on the promotion of RES 
(section C).  
Table 1: Overview of possible market design 
options 
 
A. Promote low carbon technologies 
Using the example of the United Kingdom, Baker 
(2010) concludes that there appears to be an 
emerging consensus: the existing market design is 
unlikely to provide the necessary investment 
incentives in low carbon technologies to satisfy the 
UK’s climate change goals. The Energy Market 
Assessment (EMA) by the HM treasury/DECC (HM 
2010), which is the basis for the analysis carried 
out by Baker (2010), discusses the five possible 
models for altering the current design of the UK 
electricity market (as is shown in Figure 3). In 
addition Baker (2010) discusses two capacity based 
market options.  
1. Greater carbon price certainty alone 
(Option A in Figure 3): A competitive 
market framework, where all generators 
sell their electricity in a wholesale market, 
is the basis of this concept. The support 
schemes for RES would remain in place. 
The government would increase the 
certainty on future carbon prices to 
encourage investments in low carbon 
technologies. This could be conducted for 
example with an additional payment, paid 
by the government to low carbon 
generators as soon as the carbon price falls 
below a certain level. 
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2. Support low-carbon investments in current 
markets (Option B in Figure 3): In this 
concept a competitive wholesale market for 
all technologies is again the basis. The 
government would intervene by giving 
additional payments to low carbon 
generators beside the additional payments 
mentioned in option A, if the electricity 
price falls below a certain level. This could 
be done by obligations, feed-in tariffs and 
additional payments. This approach 
provides for higher and more certain 
revenues.  
3. Regulate to limit high-carbon generation 
(Option C in Figure 3): Another option to 
achieve the climate change goals via 
regulatory intervention.  The government 
would by law limit the amount of high 
carbon generation units that can be built 
and/or limit the full load operation hours of 
existing plants (HM 2010). 
4. Separate low carbon market for electricity 
(Option D in Figure 3): This option 
guarantees a revenue stream which is 
separated from the existing wholesale 
market. The price could be determined by 
competitive tendering, being set by the 
government or by the regulation of an 
appropriate return. 
5. Single buyer agency (Option E in Figure 3): 
In this model a central agency needs to be 
established and acts as the only buyer of 
electricity from the utilities. The agency 
would identify the need for low carbon 
technologies based on the GHG emission 
reduction goal. If the generating capacity 
was procured on the basis of levelised costs 
and not on variable costs, the single buyer 
model could transform the nature of the 
electricity market (Baker 2010). Due to 
their high levelised costs, there would be no 
reason to dispatch low carbon emission 
capacities on the basis of submitted bids via 
a spot market. Therefore, the dispatch is 
instead determined on basis of a carbon 
emission hierarchy and between plant 
technologies on basis of marginal cost. This 
approach will improve the investment 
climate by providing investors with 
confidence through guaranteed income 
streams. Furthermore this will lead to a 
reduction of capital costs since the price 
uncertainty and volatility is decreasing 
(Baker 2010). 
Figure 3: EMA market reform options ([Baker 2010] based on [HM 2010])
6. Capacity obligations on suppliers: The 
underlying idea is to concentrate on low 
carbon capacity rather than on the output. 
Several examples exist where obligations 
are placed on suppliers to procure sufficient 
generation capacity (Baker 2010). These 
obligations mainly focus on the security of 
supply. To support low carbon technologies 
these obligations need to be defined as 
technology-specific ones. In general, it 
would be possible to achieve investments in 
low carbon technologies and security of 
supply. This could be conducted in terms of 
capacity certificates. Suppliers would need 
to purchase these certificates, with the 
proceeds distributed to the certificate 
holders. These certificates need to consider 
the carbon intensity of different 
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technologies by premium payments for low 
carbon technologies. Another possibility is a 
bid system on the basis of carbon intensity 
and bid price (Gottstein 2010).  
7. Capacity obligations on the system 
operator: Another option is to place an 
obligation on the system operator rather 
than on the supplier. Again, several 
systems already exist with the focus of 
establishing a generation capacity 
requirement. These capacity markets are 
technology-neutral and are focusing only on 
the security of supply. However, there is no 
reason why a capacity market could not be 
designed in a way that the carbon intensity 
of generation is considered. So both could 
be achieved - security of supply and carbon 
emission reduction goals (Baker 2010). The 
system operator is to be preferred as the 
obligated party, because of his ability to 
anticipate further system needs, such as 
the optimization of the generation portfolio. 
However, it is unclear how a non-market 
based requirement could co-exist with 
investments on a commercial basis (Baker 
2010).  
B. Develop a market for a completely 
renewable electricity system 
In Winkler (2012), market design options are 
further analyzed, particularly for a completely 
renewable power sector in Germany. The study 
differentiates between changes applied to the 
power system and to the market design. The 
changes applied to the market design can be 
distinguished in three ways; changes to the current 
market design, add-ons to the current market 
design and more radical market changes. Winkler 
(2012) analyzes how the market rules can be 
changed to address the challenges of generating 
investment incentives and cost recovery.  
8. Change the pricing system to pay-as-bid: 
The change of the current pricing system to 
a pay-as-bid pricing is one proposal 
analyzed. Auction winners would get paid 
their bid price instead of the most 
expensive bid price that is accepted. It is to 
assume that market participants would bid 
with their fixed operation costs and variable 
costs to assure cost recovery. This is not 
necessarily the case, since plant operators 
need to dispatch more often to at least 
partly recover costs. in particular, plants 
with high capital costs and low marginal 
costs will try to dispatch as often as 
possible. 
9. Dispatch based on marginal costs and 
pricing on LCOE: Another way of changing 
the pricing in the electricity spot market is 
by allowing more complex bids. The system 
operator would be informed of the marginal 
as well as the average production costs of 
the market participants. The dispatch of the 
plants would be organized according to 
rising marginal costs, whereas payments 
would be based on the average production 
costs. This approach could lead to different 
problems. “The information asymmetry 
between the generators and the market 
operator can be used for influencing the 
prices” according to Winkler (2012)4. This 
complex bidding system could also lead to 
inefficient plant dispatch and a 
disproportional increase of technologies 
with low marginal costs.  
10. Market premium: A further add-on to the 
market design can be the introduction of a 
market premium. In a completely 
renewable electricity system a market 
premium can support intermittent RES and 
reduce investment uncertainty by using a 
“cap and floor” system. Similar to fixed 
feed-in tariffs, the government or the 
system operator is challenged to set the 
right level for the market premium to 
ensure sufficient investments and to avoid 
windfall profits for generators. 
11. Technology-specific auctions: Technology-
specific auctions and long term contracts 
could also be possible changes to the 
market design. An example of such a 
system can be found in Brazil. Similar to 
capacity markets the generator is paid a 
price for the capacity, but in addition, 
intermittent sources are paid a long term 
payment for electricity generated, similar to 
feed-in tariffs. The prices for the payments 
are determined via an auction. Such a 
system would solve the problem of cost 
recovery and investment incentives but 
incorporates other potential drawbacks. A 
central instance needs to define the 
capacity need for each technology, which 
                                               
4 Plant operators could bid with lower marginal cost to get 
a guaranteed dispatch while at the same time bid with 
higher LCOE as they actual have. 
Rapid response Energy Brief 
April 2015  3 
 
  
 
6 
can lead to technology lock-in or disregard 
for alternative technologies5. 
C. Promote renewable energies 
Similar to the capacity obligations discussed by 
Baker (2010) under option 7, Öko-Institut (2014) 
proposes a market model for the reform of the 
German energy-only-market. It particularly 
addresses the need for RES, but recognizes that the 
technologies will probably not be able to refinance 
themselves on the actual EOM. This proposal is 
more detailed than the analysis carried out by 
Baker (2010) and is therefore included here within 
in a separate subsection.  
12. Capacity market: The new proposed model 
is a combination of EOM and capacity 
market. In general all new capacities - 
conventional and renewable - are facing the 
electricity price signals of the EOM. “The 
standard option for this is the mandatory 
direct sale introduced with the 2014 
amendment of the German EEG”. In 
addition to the achieved revenues from the 
EOM, all new capacities are rewarded with 
capacity payments. This payment is 
determined ex ante and is fixed on a long 
term. For intermittent producers, the 
capacity payment is made on basis of a 
reference capacity credit that is compatible 
with the needs of the future electricity 
system and is determined by the mean 
feed-in for the middle eight deciles of the 
hours of a year. Dispatchable capacity, 
renewable as well as conventional, is priced 
by its nominal capacity. This approach 
guarantees a fixed revenue stream and 
reduces the price uncertainty. In addition to 
the capacity payments, a risk margin 
mechanism accompanies the model to 
account for unexpected high revenues. If 
the revenues for each technology group 
exceed a strike price, the plant operator 
must pay a corresponding cash settlement. 
This payment is set off against the capacity 
payment. To achieve special targets this 
model foresees additional payments. Figure 
4 illustrates the proposed mechanism.  
Another possible market design to promote RES is 
proposed by Kopp (2013) and is similar to market 
                                               
5 Germany and other European countries are about to 
introduce systems that are based on auctions for RES. 
premium (option 10) proposed by Winkler (2012). 
Kopp (2013) identifies six possible options to 
promote renewable energies. Three options are 
based on feed-in tariffs and premiums and would be 
guided by the government. The remaining three 
options are dependent on a competitive market 
design. Three out of the six options are combined 
to form the new market design. 
13. Competitive premium system: This concept 
is based on two revenue streams for RES: 
 Revenues from decentralized trading of the 
produced electricity on the energy-only-
market. 
 An additional long-term payment of a fixed 
premium over a period of 15-20 years. The 
level of the premium is determined through 
an auction. 
The direct trading on the EOM guarantees 
that the electricity production from RES 
reacts on market signals and therefore will 
lead to an efficient plant operation (Kopp 
2013). The additional premium makes it 
possible for plant operators to recover their 
capital costs.  
In an auction the government defines a 
financing budget for RES. Auction 
participants would apply for a part of this 
budget by indicating their full costs over the 
contract duration e.g. 20 years. 
Alternatively they could bid for support 
needed (difference between market price in 
the hours they produce and their full costs), 
which would better reflect the different 
market value of the different technologies. 
The lowest bids are awarded first with the 
level of their bid (pay-as-bid). This is 
carried on in an ascending order until the 
budget is exhausted.  The bids can either 
refer to capacity (MW) or to production 
(MWh) with a limited number of full load 
hours. The auction can be technology 
unspecific, meaning one budget for all 
renewable technologies applying, or 
technology specific, where the budget for 
each technology is set individually.
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Figure 4: Market model proposed by [Öko-Institut 2014]
Assessment of the market designs 
presented 
Based on the market designs reviewed there are 
different options to modify the electricity market 
design. The options presented differ regarding their 
focus, complexity, the degree of change to the 
wholesale market and the instruments that are 
used to achieve the goal of the market design 
reform. Table 2 evaluates the market designs 
according to the above mentioned characteristics. 
Guaranteeing higher certainty over future carbon 
prices will probably not solve the problem for RES 
to refinance on a market, based on marginal cost, 
according to Kopp (2012).  
Assumed small changes like changing the pricing 
mechanism of an electricity market, as presented 
by Winkler (2012), to a pay-as-bid auction may not 
solve the problem of achieving investment 
incentives for low-carbon generators. Greater 
changes to the pricing mechanism based on 
average production costs, would imply a higher 
degree of complexity (Winkler 2012). This change 
would also mean a re-ordering of the plant 
dispatch. A further inclusion of the carbon intensity 
into the dispatch as proposed by Baker (2010) 
would result in an environmental feature into the 
market design. However, it is unclear how to 
implement a concrete GHG emissions reduction goal 
in such a mechanism and therefore the degree of 
complexity will probably further increase. 
Add-ons to the current market, like capacity 
mechanisms or feed-in premiums, which are 
already applied in some countries, could be a 
further option. Öko-Institut (2014) presents how 
such a system could be implemented in the German 
electricity market. The focus of the system is on 
RES and therefore it is not promoting all low carbon 
technologies. The question remains whether such 
systems could be extended to include low carbon 
generators in general.  Baker (2010) mentions that 
the carbon intensity could be considered in capacity 
mechanisms, to promote low carbon generation in 
general. However, this again will increase the 
complexity of an already complex system.  
Table 2: Evaluation of the characteristics of 
the presented market design options 
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The assessment further shows that there are three 
main tendencies of market design reforms: 
 Keep the existing EOM and market add-ons 
for low carbon technologies; 
 The establishment of a separate market for 
low carbon technologies; 
 An overall single market based on levelised 
costs of electricity production and plant 
dispatch based on marginal costs or carbon 
intensity. 
In Table 3 we make our own assessment of each 
option to one of the three main tendencies. 
Additionally, each option is evaluated regarding 
whether it provides investment incentives and if the 
system is dependent on additional payments. 
Market design options which are based on 
additional payments would probably lead to a 
higher investment incentive for market participants. 
The overall single market is the option that does 
not include additional payments for low carbon 
technologies. This market design option might lead 
to investments in inefficient technologies. A pricing 
system centered on LCOE can provide investment 
incentives but as long as the dispatch is based on 
marginal cost or carbon intensity there will be no 
incentive for technologies with low marginal cost 
and zero CO2 emissions to improve the efficiency of 
the market, since their dispatch is guaranteed.  
Table 3: Assessment of the 14 market design 
options 
 
 
Conclusion 
The cost recovery of RES in an EOM is a 
controversial question. There are indications that a 
fixed-charge coverage on an electricity market, 
which is based on marginal cost, is unlikely for 
renewable energy sources at this point of time 
(Kopp 2012). With an increasing share of RES and 
due to the merit-order effect, this is also likely for 
other low carbon technologies, which have high 
capital and high variable costs. Therefore, it is likely 
that there will be a “missing-money-problem” for 
low carbon technologies. This leads to the question 
how the market design could be transformed to 
promote low-carbon technologies. 
The presented options for altering the market 
design to promote low carbon technologies have 
up- and downsides and differ in their degree of 
complexity. A future market design should be as 
simple as possible, as an increasing degree of 
complexity could also lead to higher uncertainty for 
market participants, besides the uncertainty that 
would arise due to the market change. The 
introduction of a market premium instead of feed-in 
tariffs or auctions for RES, which are recommended 
in the EU guidelines (EC 2014), for example could 
help to bring renewable energy technologies closer 
to the market, while keeping the changes to the 
market to a minimum. This will improve the 
understanding on how renewable energy 
technologies will participate in the market. However 
it is unclear in which way these instruments need to 
be transformed to include low carbon technologies 
in general.  
A change in the pricing system from marginal cost 
to LCOE and a changed dispatch would mean a 
restructuring of the market design. Different 
aspects need to be considered to guarantee a level 
playing field for the different technologies. But the 
question remains how a completely new system can 
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be implemented and it is questionable if it is 
necessary at this point.  
The assessment further shows that there seem to 
be three main tendencies for altering the market 
design to promote low carbon (existing EOM with 
market add-ons for low carbon technologies, a 
separate market for low carbon technologies or an 
overall single market based on levelised costs). The 
establishment of a separate market for low carbon 
technologies or a change in the pricing system are 
complex instruments and an implementation seems 
unrealistic.  However, further research is needed to 
be able to identify which of the tendencies is 
suitable to satisfy the needs of the future electricity 
system. 
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